Central war section of
Secretary of Defense guidance
for Joint Thiefs of Staff
strategic war planning.
signed by
Secretary Machamara, (May, 1961)

the comblishment of peace terms which are compatible with the longtime comblishment of peace terms which are compatible with the longrange objectives of the United States. The goal of the United States is
not to destroy any nation, but, if war should occur, to frustrate end
defeat opposing military forces and to create the conditions under which
the opponents will become responsible members of the international
community. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its
wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare, whather
it be nuclear or non-nuclear, local or global. Specifically, the United
States does not hold all the people of Russia, China, or the Satellite nations
responsible for the acts of their governments. Consequently, it is not an
objectives of the United States to maximize the number of people killed
in the Communist Bloc in the event of war.

These are imposing objectives for the immediate fature. They cannot be easily achieved. But the Free World, led as it must be by the United States, is substantially more powerful than the Communist Bloc.

There is no adequate reason why the threats that comfront us comes be successfully communed and the opportunities successfully emploited.

Section E. Military Problems and Objectives

There are a number of ways in which the security interests of the United States could be jespardized new and in the fature. Among the most corious possibilities are;

- 1. A deliberate major anchear asseult on the United States.
- 2. A major assault on an area of vital interest to the United States, in particular on that area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
- 3. A deliberate nuclear attack on the United States by a minor muclear powers which could involve the major nuclear powers.
- of incidents or intentions, folco nierms, or manthorized actions.
- 5. Local aggression of the in the form of invesion or subversion against an ally of the United States or against a state whose independence and integrity is considered of importance to the United States.
- which the armed forces of the United States and the Sino-Soviet Blocker directly involved.
- 7. An accident, unanthorized action, or sabotage involving determinent of a nuclear weapon which could lead to a degradation of readiness and elect measures, loss of base rights, weakening of alliances, or major political concessions by an ally in time of crisis.
- United States at all times. The most urgent objectives are:
- 1. To deter may deliberate anchor assault upon the United States or its Allies.
- 2. To deter or irestrate attempts by the Sime-Seviet Blac to entered to political, military and idealogical influence by the threater-

- 2. To this end, to reduce the military capabilities of the opposite and to retain major strategic capabilities, ready, effective and the controlled.
- 3. To minimize domago to the United States and its Allies, and in all events to limit such domage to a level consistent with national survival and independence. When the professional entire and independence. When the professional entire and independence.
- 4. Consistent with the above objectives, in achieve decisive military superiority over the exponent.
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considered and object on when the one of principle to the control of the control

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section F. Policy for Central War Posture and Strategy

Goals.

forestall them.

The second of th The primary objectives of U. S. policy with respect to central war And the second s must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak. The The first section of the second of the secon U. S. rejects armed aggression as a means of enhancing its security; nor give the group of the first state of the first of the fir can major thermonuclear war be its preferred instrument in meeting armed and the first term to represent the term of the term of the term of the terms of th aggression by others. It is an object of U. S. policy that there be adequate grand and the second of the second alternatives to the initiation by the U. S. of central war. Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, U. S. military strength must still serve and the first transport of the first state of the first of the state of the first o multiple national objectives.

angagan gerapa na katapatan lain na sa tagaga kantana kanaga kada katapat da sa taga katapat sa taga katapat s

হয়। ১ ছৈল। ১ টোপ্টের প্রান্থ ক্রেপ্টের চন্দ্রনারি টুন্ত ক্রিক্ত নিক্রিক নিক্র ক্রেটার ক্রেপ্টের করিছে কর্মিটার হিছি করি Central war can result from a variety of causes ther than the Land Control of the c calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve g ja ja ja 1900 gala oli galaja kirjir jurijir. Ta ragalaja ili kira kariki kiriki kiriki kala kala ili kirika decisive superiority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack. National tion of the state of the contract of the state of the sta planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence will grander gregorigen generalistiggen geholder der deutsche Teilereit, der die deutsche der mit der der Gebeiter certainly succeed, that unpremeditated nuclear attacks cannot occur, or in the Alignaphy of Service the more particles and the present the extent of the fields that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to fifill its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or waging graph of the region of the common temperature is a section of the common temperature and the common te central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a central war Google Land of the end of the control of the Green of as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the best outcome attainable . in central war may represent unprecedented catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain an urgent goal of U. S. security policy to , and the first first the second of the second seco

four control war posture and strategy must continuously be tested ...

for ability to prevent deliberate or undeliberated attack but for ability to socure basic national objectives in wartime. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce sach other.

The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed U. S. confronting armed opponents. It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces... or controls; it is equally important that the U. S. not disarm itself, by tempending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to the way disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union must be left in no doubt dray that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future cirumstances in which U. S. countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial attack; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were initially untargetable or that could be destroyed only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual : capability. To the extent that conscreative planning must allow for the survival of such Soviet forces, U. S. posture and strategy must permit the retoution of ready am uncommitted forces in reserve, at least comparable to estimated Soviet residual forces in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by authorized political leadership.

A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military

ek any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise attack would be futile and costly; an asseult could neither win military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation that could be founded by U. S. forces.

At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its.

Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on advantageous terms. U. S. countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; the survival of sizeable U. S. ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately left unbit in initial attacks, can destroy the will or surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital et de recto ja di entre politica de secretor a pri esperanti il periodi di la seconda di la companya de la comp in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not and the second s deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict grave damage. Under a transfer de de distriction, et la figura de la financia del financia del financia de la financia del la financia de la finan those same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers would fail to inhibit cumitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the and the think of the same and the same of possibility that enemy response could be controlled or terminated to U. S. or or strang war . advantage.

The ability of U. S. ready forces held in reserve to extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately

se premoditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will reflect his presttack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U. S. capabilities and options. The prospect of confronting sizozbio, protected and controlled U. S. reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on U. S. or Allied socie under any circum stancas; it should further induce him to undertake preparets for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for determing continuance of hostilities.

Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superior: at any stage of the conflict offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its Allies and of stopping the war on the most advantageous terms possible.

At the same time, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood " of accidents, unauthorized actions or unintended nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to detar or defeat local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safaguarded arms control agreements and by non-military means. Contingencies

Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various U. S. security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies. absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the U. S. might also seem dangerous to him. Its ability in deter must be able to withstand sinceble enemy miscalculation of U. S. intentions or capabilities, and should offer hope of withstanding unforeseen technological shifts. Its ability to prevent or to contain the political and military consequences of accidents, unauthorized actions, false clarms or "third party" actions must be considered for varied situations of international tension and local war, when such incidents are both more likely and more dangerous than in periods of relative calmanted already excess to the likely and more dangerous than

Heatral war should occur, despite U. S. efforts to reduce its

likelihood, there could be wide variance in the circumstances of initiation,
enemy posture and readiness, enemy tectics, the results of initial attacks,
the attitudes and actions of Allies on both sides, and enemy wartime objectives.

Ability to achieve U. S. wartime objectives would depend upon ability to
adapt U. S. strategic response to these various circumstances, which might
the unforcessen, ambiguous, or both. A single detenation or several might

pressage a major assault, or come by accident, unauthorized action to
attack by a minor power. A surprise attack might be calculated and welldesigned or a hasty response to false tactical warning or miscalculation of
U. S. intentions. It might be well or poorly executed, providing much
warning or none; retaining sizeable, protected enemy reserves or few;
destroying all but the most protected U. S. forces or failing to do so. It

and major command centers or it might carefully avoid such targets. Central war might cluminate an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightoned alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert. Enemy posture and readiness might lack major vulnerability, assuring the survival under counterforce attack of major mobile, concealed or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to protect parts of his pystem effectively.

This list of possibilities is not exhautive. Intermediate situations between the extremes cited may offer special problems; and "surprises"; in the form of wholly unforeseen circumstances are likely.

Among all these centingencies, it is not exclusively the "worst" cases or even the most likely ones that deserve attention; the design of posture and strategy should provide insurance against a broad range of uncertain possibilities. It is necessary to be able to exploit even improbably favorable wartime possibilities, such as windfalls of intelligence or warning, badly executed onemy attack, or urgent desire of leaders of one or more enemy nations to surrender after early operation. A capability for flexible response under high-level, informed and experienced political leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in such favorable cases, or in the ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized action, "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war. It is in these situations that the need for a range of options alternative to an all-out,

would include a series of well-designed alerting actions and defensive measures, communication with Allies and potential enemies, augmentation of intelligence and warning systems, and implementation of threats and discriminating counterforce attacks.

Requirements of the second of the second of the

To satisfy these demands, military posture for central war should acquire, as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the following general characteristics:

strength, should be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without essential reliance upon calck reaction to warning. A sizeable fraction of such forces should be capable of enduring in a wartime environment under prolonged reattack, as a ready reserve force responsive to flexible, centralized control.

conduct of nuclear war should be exercised at all times by highest national muthority. The President will determine and review procedures for such control, including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of Presidential inability to control. There should be reliable physical safety guards against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear weapons, including weapons under dual control with an Ally; in particular, weapons on high alort status, in mobile launchors, and in planes launched under

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Me control. Authorized procedures and protected control capabilities should assure an opponent of an effective, properly authorized response under all direumstances of attack, without any reliance upon the possibility of unauthorized initiative.

- : " 3. Information. Reliable, unequivocal bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals at key warning, communications and command points and all major offensive force bases; and detectors at all major cities, should be provided to assure any opponent that dependable notification of any surprise attack cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the size and nature of enemy attack, the status of U. S. bases and the level of damage to U. S. society. So far as practicable, reliable information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor, and reconnaissance systems, including protected post-attack capabilities, should, be provided to furnish more discriminating knowledge of the source and nature of attack, U. S. and enemy residual capability, and damage to ... U. S., Allied, and enemy societies. Means should be provided for prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly devolution of command in accordance with authorized procedures. The white the members of a finite or of the colored
- aircraft, should be capable of selective commitment against alternative targets, with capability for rapid retargeting after attack. Forces held in

well as retaliatory attacks against non-military targets.

- 5. Countermilitary canability. Offensive counterforce capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, should be able to reduce enemy residual military capability at least to levels that will ensure the strategic advantage of U. S. residual forces; they should be equipped to exploit possible vultimes and interest in Soviet planning or execution of attacks. These means are should be complemented by (a) georgraphic separation of U. S. strategic forces from population centers to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provides adaquate follows protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important U. S. military strengths.
- the basis of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, wiscontingency plans should be provided corresponding to gross differences in the circumstances and course of control war. In particular, alternative options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding major control while retaining U. S. ready residual forces to threaten these targets; the option to exclude major control content from counterforce attacks

id also be available under all circumstances. Alternative plans covering control war with the USSR will provide both for the inclusion and exclusion of Communist China and other individual members of the Sina-Soviet Blac and the second of the second o in initial attacks, the choice to be designated by the President or highest and the second of the second o surviving national authority at the time of hostilities. So far as conand the state of t sistent with military objectives: (a) all plans for military action against Bloc members other than the USSR and Communist China should minimize fallout and non-military damage and casualties; (b) all pllamed attacks the first think on successive constants for the particular terms and the second sections and the second sections. against designated enemy mations should be designed to minimize resulting en de la fille de la responsación de la fille de la fille de la conferencia de la fille de la conferencia de l La conferencia de la responsación de la fille de la fille de la conferencia de la fille de la conferencia de l damage and casualties in all other nations, in particular neutrals and Allies en est me de est sint kodes de est est en est est est est est de la mente de est est est est est est est est e of the U.S. Management, decision and planning aids should be provided to to got fill to be in the median production to which there is the contract of permit rapid- re-planning prior to, and, as practicable, during hostilities. en om transporter for the section of While avoiding promature decisions or commitments, guidelines should be formulated and kept under review specifying acceptable terms for ending the sound the description of the state of th hostilities, suitable to the several circumstances under which central war · 我们是这种的数据数据,这是"我们"的1982年中,我们对1982年中最近 might commence and proceed; those terms should provide for the satis-កភ្នំ ក្រុង ក្នុងកំឡុង និងការអាត្តិការការសង្គាន់ក្រុងការស្នេការបានក្រុងក្នុងស្នា faction of U. S. security objectives in such circumstances, without a pre-determined requirement for unconditional enemy surrender. The President and the Secretary of Defense will raview all strategic plans.

7. Protected Command. The protected command, communications and information systems should permit coordinated, informed and solective overall direction of U. S. forces by the highest surviving, authorized civilian and military leaders; to the utmost curent feasible,

ection should be by highest constituted political authorities at all times. In particular, these systems should be designed and protected to minimize the loss of command expability and political leadership that could result from a small number of detonations, stemming from accident, unauthorized action, attack by a minor power, badly executed attack or attack intended to avoid U. S. command capabilities. By means of mobility, hardening, active defense, dispersal, intermetting, or concealment, the protection of primary command facilities and communications serving highest national leadership should aim to raise the cost to the enemy of destroying primary centers to a level which would deter him from planning to attack them, given his inability - which must be assured with the highest confidence - to parelyze U. S. response by doing so. Plans for protection of primary command. capabilities and leadership should not rely upon warning, but should be prepared to utilize available warning, either strategic or tactical.

system should enable highest surviving antional leaders to exploit, in pursuit of national objectives, the full capability for selective, deliberate, response provided by force flexibility and endurance, information, and countermilitary capability. It should enable them to use surviving forces efficiently, to make significant choices as to overall target objectives, scope and timing of attacks, and to modify these choices during heartilities.

basis of new information. It should allow commanders not only to select proplanted responses but to modify them or, within limits, to improvise new ones. It should support their efforts to end hostilities on the most advantageous possible terms. It must provide highly reliable means for transmitting authenticated "Stop" or "Recall" orders to offensive forces in addition to initial "Go" orders. National leaders should have swift, reliable means of communications with Allied and enemy leaders prior to and during hostilities. Plans and preparations should be made to enable U. S. national leaders effectively to invest en use of U. S. reserve forces against civil or military targets as yet unhit; to carry out domonstrations; to provide evidence of remaining capabilities or to mislead the enemy by cover and deception activities; to propose terms acceptable to the U. S. for ending hostilities, safeguarding U. S. security interests in the light of circumstances of war initiatin, the conduct of the war and the results of initial operations; and to monitor and emorce conformity to agreed terms. Mainte state some control the T. I. some well-used A U. S. military posture with these broad capabilities permits a wide variety of strategic responses under varying conditions of central war. Its major post-attack capabilities should effectively deter deliberate attack; yet if central war occurs, they give highest national authority maximum opportunity to preserve U. S. military advantages, to limit demage to the U. S. and its Allies and to stop the war on the most advantageous possible terms. They will allow U. S. commanders to emploit any

minity in wartime to disarm the opponent or to achieve decisive

minary superiority in support of U. S. postwar aims, if circumstances

offer hope of doing so without grave jeopardy to other national goals. If
an aggressor should initiate central war, these capabilities will assure

him of a decisive degradation in his relative military power position and of

unprecedented damage to his society (even with a countermilitary U. S.

response); they will assure him of still greater damage and further

worsening of his military position if he should continue the conflict. They

would warn him that direct attack upon U. S. and Allied civil society would

be, under any circumstances, the worst of all possible actions.

Moreover, this posture will reduce the likelihood of unpremeditated nuclear exchanges. The protected commend system, safeguarded positive control, and ability to achieve essential goals by deliberate response, without reliance upon hasty reaction under ambiguous circumstances, should reduce both the chance and enemy fear of U. S. accident, unauthorized action or false alarm. At the same time, the U. S. posture reduces the tendency of any opponent to attack hastily under similarly ambiguous circumstances, since the prospect of U. S. post-attack capabilities deprives him of incentive to do so.

In comparison to current posture, the most urgent changes demanded involve principally qualitative characteristics of force capabilities rather than major increases in force size. These characteristics complement each other; but they are important individually. Progress toward achieving

ajor security objectives does not domand that they all be attained simultancously. In particular, all opportunities to improve the ability of constituted leaders to control the forces in a deliberate, discriminating fashion,
and to enlarge the range of alternative options available to them, should be
exploited on an immediate and contiming basis.

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The U.S. signification of least appropriate to property in which interests. It and its Elliss must therefore by property in these or, if successary, to sepel luminor, the sign when we want the reservoir of the sepel luminor, the sign which which the least one policy than the second one policy which is to extring ever.

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 ผู้สุดสารญชาวไทยของผู้ผู้ผู้สารทำสารพบสารแบบสำคัญสารที่สุดสมบัติสารณ์ คระสงในสำคัญสารที่สารที่สารท สารทางการแบบสารณ์ เมื่อผู้สารทางสารพบพระสารณ์ของสารณ์ที่สารณ์ พระสารณ์ของสารณ์ (แม่คำกับ) (คระสารณ์)

Daniel Ellsberg!s draft of cable to SAC Commander (Gen. Power), sent by Sec. Mcnamara

upon their ability to respond successfully to the simulator was entirely in any of its foreseeable forms. This will require, among other things, that the highest national authority be capable of solecting and response which will provide the United States and its Allies the maximum possible advantage in the specific circumstances under which deterrence may fail. It is my belief that the ability to select from among a wide range of feasible response options suited to specific circumstances could permit the United States and its Allies to select from the united States and its Allies to select from the formal war, in a position enabling resumed progress toward their common objectives, with casualties and damage reduced significantly below levels which might otherwise be expected.

It is my intention to encourage and support plans and programs which will in the future provide a posture affording such a wide latitude of response options, especies of selection and control for maximum advantage. Concurrently with improvements in our posture, it should be possible to reflect in basic policies and war plans, to the degree made feasible by progress toward the requisite capabilities, provisions for increased latitude in options for selective response to thermonuclear war emergency.

I am, therefore, also interested in prospects for the shorter term time period. The currently effective Single Integrated Operational Plan for strategic attack (SIOP-62) permits a variety of options/contingencies or response by forces committed to strategic offensive tasks, keyed principally to duration of warming, geographic discretion, constraints, and specifics of weather and visibility. Similar latitude is in other atomic war plans.

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause the Director of Strategic Target Planning to scrutinize the current SIOP-62 and forces committed to its execution, and that other appropriate Commanders-in-Chief similarly scrutinize their

scruting will be to provide answers to me on the following:

- a. To what specific extent might it be feasible in the near term 1961-1962 time period to provide a wider latitude of options for response to thermonuclear war emergency, assuming that any impediments to this action embedied in the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy were removed?
- b. If such additional options are deemed feasible, and desirable, what would be the prudent and realistic time schedule for their earliest integration into current plans?
- c. If such additional options would depend upon changes in capabilities, would any such changes be feasible of accomplishment at reasonable cost and effort in the near term, and what specific actions would be necessary?
- d. What capabilities presently lacking would be the principal requirements for a future posture permitting a wide variety of response options calculated to derive maximum advantage from any of the reasonably foreseeable circumstances under which deterrence to central war might fail?
- e. Are there any other major problems or difficulties forescen, in light of the recognized necessity to avoid any disruption in the continuity of our current war plans and capabilities, which could weaken the overall deterrent posture?

Of specific interest would be assessment of the possibilities affecting the early development of options which might permit avoidance of attacks against enemy urban-industrial and population resources as such in initial attacks; options which would permit exclusion from initial attack, to the extent feasible, of one or more member nations of the Sino-Soviet bloc without the necessity for replanning the balance of the attack; options which would relieve selected elements of ready forces

from initial attack assignments to permit their retention as uncommitted ready reserves for possible subsequent use; options providing varying degrees of adjustment, beyond those currently planned, in force posture during periods of critical tension; and so forth.

Response by 15 June 1961 will be appreciated.

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- 1. Eliminate SIUP as single, automatic response in Central War.
- 2. Requires alternative plans.
- 7. Calls for plans providing for withholding of Sarvivable forces, initial avoidance of some enemy cities, initial avoidance of governmental/military controls.
- 4. Calls for President and SecDef to exercise authority over strategic planning and strategic direction; review JSCP and supporting plans, SOP's (alert, safety, "execute" message), monitor procedures.
- 5. Survivable, flexible CoC system; headed by President or as high, authoritativez a figure as possible.
- b. National objectives/will be defined/by highest civilian authorities in the detail MENEXEX formerly associated with time of war. Ambiguities in guidance to be resolved not by "agreement" among the JCS but by reference directly to the Pres or Scallec.
- 7. The enemy will to continue the war follow he reduced not by destroying all major urban-industrial areas at outset but by preserving and threatening them (and by preserving and threatening survival and control of leaders themselves). (Note requirements).
- 8. Calls for strict positive control in fact, including physical safe wards against the possibility of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, either in local or central war.
- 9. Calls for plans and preparations to use conventional weapons in local conflict, up to large-scale conflict (in addition to plans using nuclears).
 - 10. Deemphasizes nuclears for the deterrence and wasing of local war (though it does not preclude their use or exclude them from deterrent posture).
 - ll. Rejects concept that any single, inflexible plan be adopted for use in a wide range of circumstances of central war (let alone the SIUP), or that any given set of targets are marked for immediate, automatic destruction under all conditions of Central War (Kurs planta or or free)
 - 12. Designation of enemy (target) nations will be by President, not/JCS.
- 13. Rejects inevitability of Central War in war with 14. 1100p

Central war section of Secretary of Defense guidance for Joint Thiefs of Staff strategic war planning. signed by

Secretary Machamara, (May, 1961)

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- 1. A deliberate major anchear assault on the United States.
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- 4. Consistent with the above objectives, to achieve decisive military superiority over the opponent.
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section F. Policy for Central War Posture and Strategy

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and the second to a first of the first of th The primary objectives of U. S. policy with respect to central war Contract to the second must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak. The ing and the samples of the entropy of the streets of the street in the street of the street in the street of U. S. rejects armed aggression as a means of enhancing its security; nor grande in the restriction of the second section of the second section is can major thermonuclear war be its preferred instrument in meeting armed of the contract of the state of aggression by others. It is an object of U. S. policy that there be adequate alternatives to the initiation by the U. S. of central war. Yet if central war జాలంగుడు. ఇంట్లో క్రాంకింగ్ లైన ఇక్కుల నినిమిందే చేస్తాని కూడుగాడుకు దారంగాని లోకింగ్ కా is forced upon the United States, U. S. military strength must still serve An all the first commences of the transfer that the first in the period the before all the table multiple national objectives.

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হয়। এইছে । এইছে বে প্রান্ত প্রার্থিত জনতারি বিভাগী হয় নাইছে নাইছে ক্রান্ত হাইছিছে ই জিছে এই Central war can result from a variety of causes ofter than the on and the territorial of the contract of the calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve and the first of the contract of the second decisive superiority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack. National and the configuration of the c planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence will grada gregoria grapia (k.g.), kie za miero zakono za kieli za kieli problema (k. 1920). Poko za kieli zakono z certainly succeed, that unpremeditated nuclear attacks cannot occur, or i de la como de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la companya del la companya de la compa that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to fifill n de la graga desta la proposició de la el elemente de debie el el debie el el el d its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or waging grant in the engineering of the control of the english that are the growth and the second in the central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a central war garagina segunt a jaman kalangan manggan manggan bida kan kal as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the best outcome attainable. in central war may represent unprecedented catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain an urgent goal of U. S. security policy to ting the first time the second of the second

rous. central war posture and strategy must continuously be tested ...

for ability to prevent deliberate or undeliberated attack but for ability to socure basic national objectives in wartime. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce each other.

. The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed U. S. confronting armed opponents.: It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces. or controls; it is equally important that the U. S. not disarm itself, by tempending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to the weak disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union must be left in no doubt Many that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future cirumstances in which U. S. countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial attack; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were initially untargetable or that could be destroved only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual capability. To the extent that conscruative planning must allow for the survival of such Soviet forces, U. S. posture and strategy must permit the retention of ready am uncommitted forces in reserve, at least comparable to estimated Soviet residual forces in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by authorized political leadership.

A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military

ek any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed curprise attack would be futile and costly; an assault could neither win military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the muclear retaliation that could be launched by U. S. forces. the first the same of the state of the same of the sam

.At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of minimizing damage to the U.S. and its Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on advantageous terms. U. S. countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; the survival of sizeable U. S. ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately left unhit in initial attacks, can destroy the will or surviving enemy leaders e de la composição de Teléctoria to pursua unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital et de recto a la mora, o como es establica por la porta de la como in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not and the second section of the section o deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict grave damage. Under er og til fre skredet og fram for skriver i til fler til fre t those same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against and the same common that the same is the same of the s high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial the state of the s attacks on all major urban-industrial centers would fail to inhibit cunitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the manifer the section of the following comment of the comment of the section of the section of possibility that enemy response could be controlled or terminated to U. S. or a similar to the contract advantage.

The ability of U. S. ready forces held in reserve to extend deterrance, in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately

se premeditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial anamy tactics will reflect his presttack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U. S. capabilities and options. The prospect of confronting sizoablo, protected and controlled U. S. reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on U. S. or Allied socie under any circum stances; it should further induce him to undertake preparets for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of hostilities.

Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superior: at any stage of the conflict offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its Allies and of stopping the war on the most advantageous terms possible.

At the same time, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of accidents, unauthorized actions or unintended nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or defeat local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safaguarded arms control agreements and by non-military means. Contingencies - The Contingencies of the Contingenc

Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various U. S. security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies. absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the U. S. might also seem dangerous to him. Its ability to deter must be able to withstand sinceble enemy miscalculation of U. S. intentions or capabilities, and should offer hope of withstanding unforeseen technological shifts. Its ability to prevent or to contain the political and military consequences of accidents, unauthorized actions, false clarms or "third party" actions must be considered for varied situations of international tension and local war, when such incidents are both more likely and more dangerous than in periods of relative calmagnetic elements.

Heatral war should occur, despite U. S. efforts to reduce its

likelihood, there could be wide variance in the circumstances of initiation,
enemy posture and readiness, enemy tectics, the results of initial attacks,
the attitudes and actions of Allies on both sides, and enemy wartime objectives.

Ability to achieve U. S. wartime objectives would depend upon ability to
adapt U. S. strategic response to these various circumstances, which might
be unforceseen, ambiguous, or both. A single detonation or several might —

presage a major assault, or come by accident, unauthorized action to

attack by a minor power. A surprise attack might be calculated and well—
designed or a hasty response to false tactical warning or miscalculation of
U. S. intentions. It might be well or poorly executed, providing much
warning or none; retaining sizeable, protected enemy reserves or few;
destroying all but the most protected U. S. forces or failing to do so. It

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and major command centers or it might carefully avoid such targets. Certral war might cluminate an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightoned alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert. Enemy posture and readiness might lack major vulnerability, assuring the survival under counterforce attack of major mobile, concealed or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to protect parts of his system effectively.

This list of possibilities is not exhautive. Intermediate situations between the extremes cited may offer special problems; and "surprises"; in the form of wholly unforeseen circumstances are likely.

Among all these contingencies, it is not exclusively the "worst" cases or even the most likely ones that deserve attention; the design of posture in and strategy should provide insurance against a broad range of uncertain possibilities. It is necessary to be able to emploit even improbably favorable wartime possibilities, such as windfalls of intelligence or warning, badly executed onemy attack, or urgent desire of loaders of one or more enemy nations to surrender after early operation. A capability for flexible response under high-level, informed and experienced political leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in such favorable cases, or in the ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized action, "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war. It is in these situations that the need for a range of options alternative to an all-cut,

seriminating strategie response may be most urgent; important capabilities would include a series of well-designed alerting actions and defensive measures, communication with Allies and potential enemies, augmentation of intelligence and warning systems, and implementation of threats and discriminating counterforce attacks. The interest the same standard with Requirements Topostorius, in amodentiale and and and problem

To satisfy these demands, military posture for central war should acquire, as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the following general characteristics: " The Mark the stand of the

" T. Survival and endurance. Strategic offensive forces, in major strength, should be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without essential reliance upon quick reaction to warning. A sizeable fraction of such forces should be capable of enduring in a waitime environment under prolonged reattack, as a ready reserve force responsive to flamble, centralized control. The transfer interest of the acceptance to

2. Strict positive control. Control over the initiation and overall conduct of nuclear war should be exercised at all times by highest national enthority. The President will determine and review procedures for such control, including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of Prosidential inability to control. There should be reliable physical safeguards against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear weapons, including weapons under dual control with an Ally; in particular, weapons on high alort status, in mobile launchors, and in planes launched under

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five control. Authorized procedures and protected control capabilities flouid assure an opponent of an effective, properly authorized response under all circumstances of attack, without any reliance upon the possi-

- 1. 11. 3. Information. Reliable, unequivocal bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals at key warning, communications and command points and all major offensive force bases, and detectors at all major cities, should be provided to assure any opponent that dependable notification of. any surprise attack cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the size and nature of enemy attack, the status of U. S. bases and the level of damage to U. S. society. So far as practicable, reliable information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor, and reconmaissance systems, including protected post-attack capabilities, should be provided to furnish more discriminating knowledge of the source and nature of attack, U. S. and enemy residual capability, and damage to ... U. S., Allied, and enemy societies. Means should be provided for prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly devolution of command in accordance with authorized procedures. The whole the maneral and a fair the grant of
- aircraft, should be capable of selective commitment against alternative targets, with capability for rapid retargeting after attack. Forces held in

greserve should have capability for combined countermility action, well as retaliatory attacks against non-military targets.

- 5. Countermilitary canability. Offensive counterforce capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, should be able to reduce enemy residual military capability at least to levels that will ensure the strategic advantage of U. S. residual forces; they should be equipped to exploit possible vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or gross inefficiencies in Soviet planning or execution of attacks. These means residuals be complemented by (a) geographic separation of U. S. strategic forces from population centers to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such executive anti-bomber and anti-missile defenses of cities as are judged to be effective; (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provides adaquate follows protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important U. S. military strengths.
- the basis of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, with contingency plans should be provided corresponding to gross differences in the circumstances and course of control war. In particular, alternative options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding major enemy cities while retaining U. S. ready residual forces to threaten these targets; the option to exclude major control content from counterforce attacks

id also be available under all circumstances. Alternative plans covering central war with the USSR will provide both for the inclusion and exclusion of Communist China and other individual members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in initial attacks, the choice to be designated by the President or highest and the second of the second o surviving national authority at the time of hostilities. So far as conand the state of t sistent with military objectives: (a) all plans for military action against Bloc members other than the USSR and Communist China should minimize to the second of fallout and non-military damage and casualties; (b) all pliamed attacks the entremental content of the conte against designated enemy mations should be designed to minimize resulting en anglik na kulin sangai memini angkala kalangan mengali ang angkalanggan mengali mengali mengali mengali men damage and casualties in all other nations, in particular neutrals and Allies en en sin men der solle hellen geneigt i der de fill en sin hellen krieft en lædere i sedere en sedere en se of the U. S. Management, decision and planning aids should be provided to to a definite and one of the section of the other to a section of the contract of permit rapid- re-planning prior to, and, as practicable, during hostilities. en om gregen fredering fredering for a seeke bestelle het de fredering om en en de former om de stange enderg While avoiding premature decisions or commitments, guidelines should be formulated and kept under review specifying acceptable terms for ending and the second second second in the second s hostilities, suitable to the several circumstances under which central war might commence and proceed; these terms should provide for the satis-ក្រសួល ក្នុងកម្មាន សំខ្លួន ប្រកិត្តនេះ ស្ថាត់កិត្តកង្សាក្រសួលសំណាស់គេស faction of U. S. security objectives in such circumstances, without a preand the second s determined requirement for unconditional enemy surrender. The President and the Secretary of Defense will review all strategic plans.

7. Protected Command. The protected command, communications and information systems should permit coordinated, informed and solective overall direction of U. S. forces by the highest surviving, authorized civilian and military leaders; to the utmost extent leasible,

sction should be by highest constituted political authorities at all times. In particular, these systems should be designed and protected to minimize the loss of command capability and political leadership that could result from a small number of detonations, stemming from accident, unauthorized action, attack by a minor power, badly executed attack or attack intended to avoid U. S. command capabilities. By means of mobility, hardening, active defense, dispersal, intermetting, or concealment, the protection of primary command facilities and communications serving highest national leadership should aim to raise the cost to the enemy of destroying primary centers to a level which would deter him from planning to attack them, given his inability - which must be assured with the highest confidence - to paralyze U. S. response by doing so. Plans for protection of primary command. capabilities and leadership should not rely upon warning, but should be prepared to utilize available warning, oither strategic or tactical.

system should enable highest surviving national leaders to exploit, in pursuit of national objectives, the full capability for selective, deliberate, response provided by force flexibility and endurance, information, and countermilitary capability. It should enable them to use surviving forces efficiently, to make significant choices as to overall target objectives, scope and timing of attacks, and to modify these choices during hostilities.

basis of new information. It should allow commanders not only to select proplanted responses but to modify them or, within limits, to improvise new ones. It should support their efforts to end hostilities on the most advantageous possible torms. It must provide highly reliable means for transmitting authenticated "Stop" or "Recall" orders to offensive forces in addition to initial "Go" orders. National leaders should have swift, reliable means of communications with Allied and enemy leaders prior to and during hostilities. Plans and preparations should be made to enable U. S. national leaders effectively to threaten use of U. S. reserve forces against civil or military targets as yet unhit; to carry out domonstrations; to provide evidence of remaining capabilities or to mislead the enemy by cover and deception activities; to propose terms acceptable to the U. S. for ending hostilities, safeguarding U. S. security interests in the light of circumstances of war initiatin, the conduct of the war and the results of initial operations; and to monitor and emorce conformity to agreed terms. Taken white sales the T. L. of the relieve A U. S. military posture with these broad capabilities permits a wide variety of strategic responses under varying conditions of central war. Its major post-attack capabilities should effectively deter deliberate attack; yet if central war occurs, they give highest national authority maximum opportunity to preserve U. S. military advantages, to limit damage to the U. S. and its Allies and to stop the war on the most advantageous possible terms. They will allow U. S. commanders to emploit any

Initity in wartime to disarm the opponent or to achieve decisive in manify in support of U. S. postwar aims, if circumstances offer hope of doing so without grave jeopardy to other national goals. If an aggressor should initiate central war, these capabilities will assure him of a decisive degradation in his relative military power position and of unprecedented damage to his society (even with a countermilitary U. S. response); they will assure him of still greater damage and further worsening of his military position if he should continue the conflict. They would warn him that direct attack upon U. S. and Allied civil society would be, under any circumstances, the worst of all possible actions.

Moreover, this posture will reduce the likelihood of unpremeditated nuclear exchanges. The protected command system, safeguarded positive control, and ability to achieve essential goals by deliberate response, without reliance upon hasty reaction under ambiguous circumstances, should reduce both the chance and enemy fear of U. S. accident, unauthorized action or false alarm. At the same time, the U. S. posture reduces the tendency of any opponent to attack hastily under similarly ambiguous circumstances, since the prospect of U. S. post-attack capabilities deprives him of incentive to do so.

In comparison to current posture, the most urgent changes demanded involve principally qualitative characteristics of force capabilities rather than major increases in force size. These characteristics complement each other; but they are important individually. Progress toward achieving

and to enlarge the range of alternative options available to them, should be exploited on an immediate and continuing basis.

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Daniel Ellsberg's draft of cable to SAC Commander (Gen. Power), sent by Sec. Mcnamara

upon their ability to respond successfully to the samuelous was entered in any of its foreseeable forms. This will require, among other things, that the highest national authority be capable of selecting the response which will provide the United States and its Allies the maximum possible advantage in the specific circumstances under which deterrence may fail. It is my belief that the ability to select from among a wide range of feasible response options suited to specific circumstances could permit the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of the United States and its Allies to the feature of th

It is my intention to encourage and support plans and programs which will in the future provide a posture affording such a wide latitude of response options, especie of selection and control for maximum advantage. Concurrently with improvements in our posture, it should be possible to reflect in basic policies and war plans, to the degree made feasible by progress toward the requisite capabilities, provisions for increased latitude in options for selective response to thermonuclear war emergency.

I am, therefore, also interested in prospects for the shorter term time period. The currently effective Single Integrated Operational Planfor strategic attack (SIOP-62) periods a variety of options/contingencies response by forces committed to strategic offensive tasks, keyed principally to direction of warming, geographic discretion, constraints, and specifics of weather and visibility. Similar latitude is and other atomic war plans.

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cause the Director of Strategic Target Planning to scrutinize the current SIOP-62 and forces committed to its execution, and that other appropriate Commanders-in-Chief similarly scrutinize their

scruting will be to provide answers to me on the following:

- a. To what specific extent might it be feasible in the near term 1961-1962 time period to provide a wider latitude of options for response to thermonuclear war emergency, assuming that any impediments to this action embodied in the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy were removed?
- b. If such additional options are deemed feasible, and desirable, what would be the prudent and realistic time schedule for their earliest integration into current plans?
- c. If such additional options would depend upon changes in capabilities, would any such changes be feasible of accomplishment at reasonable cost and effort in the near term, and what specific actions would be necessary?
- d. What capabilities presently lacking would be the principal requirements for a future posture permitting a wide variety of response options calculated to derive maximum advantage from any of the reasonably foreseeable circumstances under which deterrence to central war might fail?
- e. Are there any other major problems or difficulties forescen, in light of the recognized necessity to avoid any disruption in the continuity of our current war plans and capabilities, which could weaken the overall deterrent posture?

Of specific interest would be assessment of the possibilities affecting the early development of options which might permit avoidance of attacks against enemy urban-industrial and population resources as such in initial attacks; options which would permit exclusion from initial attack, to the extent feasible, of one or more member nations of the Sino-Soviet bloc without the necessity for replanning the balance of the attack; options which would relieve selected elements of ready forces

from initial attack assignments to permit their retention as uncommitted ready reserves for possible subsequent use; options providing varying degrees of adjustment, beyond those currently planned, in force posture during periods of critical tension; and so forth.

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Response by 15 June 1961 will be appreciated.